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The emergence and stability of cooperation has received a great deal of
attention in the last two decades, and in fact the number of papers about this
issue has increased in the last few years: compare the 155 references in [1] with
the 314 in [2]. In spite of all this effort, the conditions allowing cooperation
to be sustained are still unclear, in particular among humans, a key issue to
understand our complex societies. One of the main reasons for this is that the
models proposed to study cooperativeness from a theoretical viewpoint have
ingredients, such as evolutionary dynamics or population structure, whose choice
changes dramatically the corresponding predictions. Furthermore, apparently
minor details, e.g., the presence of small mutations or different time scales in the
dynamics, strongly modify the model outcomes, as discussed in detail in [1]. In
this context, the review [2] deals with one of this difficulties, namely the effect
of the payoff values on cooperation in a set of social dilemmas, and proposes a
reparametrization that might lead to a more unified view.
While the ideas presented by Wang et al. [2] may be useful, it is of the utmost
importance that the community of researchers working in the field starts tak-
ing into account the experimental results that have appeared in the last years.
Otherwise, we will continue seeing more and more results obtained from a theo-
retical viewpoint that have nothing to do with the problem under consideration.
A paradigmatic example is the so-called network reciprocity, i.e., the hypothesis
that the existence of a structure (in the form of a network of connections) in a
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population supports cooperation. To date, this hypothesis is the main object
of study of many theoretical papers in spite of the fact that experiments show
that it is either wrong or, at best, has limited validity, only when the temptation
to defect is small. The conclusion relies on already a few experimental papers
that did not observe any cooperation at all [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] or found that some
cooperation might be observed for low cooperation cost [8]. This negative result
has been connected to other experiments showing that cooperation is very dif-
ficult beyond dyadic interactions [9]. There is also experimental evidence that
the existence of a network structure does not affect the observed behavior in
coordination [10]. Of all these papers, only [6] is quoted by Wang et al. [2]
and, quite surprisingly, to support the claim that heterogeneous networks lead
to cooperation, opposite to what the paper reports.
It may be argued that these experiments are done with human subjects and
that theoretical models that are nullified by them may be of relevance to other
species or situations. This may well be true, but in that case the proponents of
those models should really try to focus on a specific context to avoid defining
them in an ad hoc manner that produces confusing results. On the other hand,
model proponents explicitly say that they are interested in human cooperation.
In this case, ignoring the experimental results hampers the advancement of
the field. Only a proper feedback between theory and experiments will help
us understand how cooperation is achieved. Thus, the finding that people are
moody conditional cooperators [4, 6] and do not pay attention to others’s payoffs
[7] is the basis for a theoretical approach [11] that is in agreement with the
experimental observations. Consequently, models with a dynamics based on
the payoffs of opponents should be disregarded as candidates to explain human
behavior. Of course, larger payoff changes might affect this conclusion (in a
similar manner to the results of [8] for low temptations to defect) and perhaps
the approach proposed byWang et al. [2] might pave the way to a comprehensive
picture, but much more experimental work is needed to inform future models.
Finally, an important insight in [2] is the realization that the so-called five
mechanisms supporting cooperation are in fact one: as shown in [12], all these
mechanisms are nothing but different expressions of assortment, i.e., of the pro-
cess by which cooperators try to outcompete defectors by restricting their inter-
actions to inviduals whom they know will cooperate as well. This is an impor-
tant step that has received strong support from experiments [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]:
when people can choose their connections cooperation is significantly increased,
and the key to that increment turns out to be reputation. It would be very
interesting to develop an approach similar to the scaling in [2] for a population
structured in a dynamic network and incorporating realistic dynamics, whose
predictions could be tested in further experiments.
[1] C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sa´nchez, Evolutionary game theory: temporal
and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics, Phys. Life Rev. 6 (2009)
208–249.
[2] Z. Wang, S. Kokubo, M. Jusup, J. Tanimoto, Universal scaling for dilemma
strength in evolutionary games, Phys. Life Rev. (2015) this issue.
2
[3] O. Kirchkamp, R. Nagel, Naive learning and cooperation in network exper-
iments, Games Econ. Behav. 58 (2007) 269–292.
[4] J. Grujic´, C. Fosco, L. Araujo, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sa´nchez, Social experiments
in the mesoscale: Humans playing a spatial prisoner’s dilemma, PLOS ONE
5 (2010) e13749.
[5] A. Traulsen, D. Semmann, R. D. Sommerfeld, H. J. Krambeck, M. Milinski,
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 107 (2010) 2962–2966.
[6] C. Gracia-La´zaro, A. Ferrer, G. Ruiz, A. Taranco´n, J. A. Cuesta,
A. Sa´nchez, Y. Moreno, Heterogeneous networks do not promote coop-
eration when humans play a prisoner’s dilemma, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 109 (2012) 12922–12926.
[7] J. Grujic´, C. Gracia-La´zaro, M. Milinski, D. Semmann, A. Traulsen, J. A.
Cuesta, Y. M. A. Sa´nchez, A meta-analysis of spatial prisoner’s dilemma
experiments: Conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance, Sci. Rep. 4
(2014) 4615.
[8] D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, J. H. Fowler, N. A. Christakis, Static network
structure can stabilize human cooperation, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 111
(2014) 17093–17098.
[9] J. Grujic´, B. Eke, A. Cabrales, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sa´nchez, Three is a crowd in
iterated prisoner’s dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior,
Sci. Rep. 2 (2012) 638.
[10] A. Antonioni, M. P. Cacault, R. Lalive, M. Tomassini, Coordination on
networks: Does topology matter?, PLOS ONE 8 (2013) e55033.
[11] C. Gracia-La´zaro, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sa´nchez, Y. Moreno, Human behavior
in prisoner’s dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity, Sci. Rep.
2 (2012) 325.
[12] J. A. Fletcher, M. Doebeli, A simple and general explanation for the evo-
lution of altruism, Proc. R. Soc. B 276 (2009) 13–19.
[13] D. G. Rand, S. Arbesman, N. A. Christakis, Dynamic social networks pro-
mote cooperation in experiments with humans, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
108 (2011) 19193–19198.
[14] J. Wang, S. Suri, D. J. Watts, Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic
partner updating, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109 (2012) 14363–14368.
[15] J. A. Cuesta, C. Gracia-La´zaro, A. Ferrer, Y. Moreno, A. Sa´nchez, Reputa-
tion drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups,
Sci. Rep. 5 (2015) 7843.
3
[16] E. Gallo, C. Yan, The effects of reputational and social knowledge on co-
operation, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 112 (2015) 3647–3652.
[17] A. Antonioni, M. Tomassini, A. Sa´nchez, Short-range mobility and the
evolution of cooperation: An experimental study, Sci. Rep. 5 (2015) 10282.
4
